ผมมีความเห็นส่วนตัวที่คล้อยตามบทความนี้ครับ กล่าวคือ ในบริบทการแข่งขันเชิงภูมิรัฐศาสตร์ยุคปัจจุบัน Soft Power และ City Branding ไม่ได้เป็นนโยบายคนละชุดอีกแล้ว หากแต่เป็นกลไกเดียวกันที่ทำงานต่างระดับกัน Soft Power ทำหน้าที่กำหนดทิศทางอำนาจของรัฐและยังเป็นการตลาดทางการเมือง
I have just finished reading an article from Amarin. It was written by a close friend of mine, who is a senior academic and an expert in Korean Studies in Thailand. He often presents his views and case studies on South Korea’s soft power policy development to Thai policymakers. I follow his work regularly, partly because we are friends and partly because I am interested in South Korea’s current policy development.
I personally agree with the main idea of his article. In today’s geopolitical competition, soft power and city branding are no longer two separate policies. Instead, they function as a single, connected mechanism operating at different levels. Soft power helps shape the direction of state power and also serves as a form of political marketing.
City branding, on the other hand, is the practical space in which this power becomes visible in economic, social, and international political terms. In the article, my friend explains how South Korea has successfully combined these two dimensions in a systematic way. South Korea does not use soft power merely to create cultural popularity, but also as a strategic tool of the state. City branding is designed as part of its overall power structure. Cities are not viewed as independent competitors, but as platforms for exporting culture, technology, and creative industries under a single national policy framework.
This integration allows South Korea to transform soft power from simple image influence into tangible economic benefits and stronger bargaining power in global affairs.
When I compare this approach with that of Germany, I can see a clear difference in soft power politics. Germany still views soft power mainly as a concept rooted in political science rather than economics. Its national influence does not rely on image marketing or popular culture, but on the legitimacy of its institutions, industrial standards, and its role within multilateral systems. As a result, German city branding reflects institutional strength, with cities acting as centres of innovation, education, and regional economic leadership, rather than as strategic tools directly guided by the central government.
Japan represents another distinct position. Japanese soft power is strongly rooted in culture and is widely recognised around the world. Many Japanese cities develop their branding primarily around local identity, culture, and tourism. However, the integration of soft power and city branding into state strategy remains cautious and gradual. Consequently, Japan’s cultural influence is symbolically strong, but its conversion into policy influence and economic advantage proceeds at a slower pace.
Overall, soft power and city branding are not universal tools that operate in the same way in every country. They are shaped by each nation’s history, state structure, and geopolitical position.
In my view, South Korea employs city branding as the operational arm of its strategic soft power. Germany uses its cities as bases of institutional power within a political framework, while Japan uses its cities to preserve and expand its cultural capital. These differences demonstrate that power in the modern world does not reside solely in the state or in cities, but in the ability to connect both levels in a coherent and coordinated manner.
Sawaddee krub
สวัสดีครับ
ณัฐพล จารัตน์
Natthaphon Jarat
